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Abstract 
The response to the Level 3 disaster of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines involved a large number of organizations providing 
assistance and support. Coordination structures between a large variety of international and national organizations, the 
government and the military were established at the national, provincial and local levels. These coordination efforts were 
accompanied by a significant information management effort, including the needs assessment of the affected population and 
monitoring and evaluation regarding the response and assistance provided. This paper presents preliminary findings from a 
research field trip conducted in the aftermath of the Typhoon response by the authors. Interviews were conducted with a broad 
range of decision makers in various functions in the disaster response organizations and with varying responsibilities. These 
interviews were complemented with in-field observations and secondary data collection. Preliminary findings show a decreasing 
complexity and rigidity of coordination structures from the headquarters to the (deep) field, and a corresponding decreasing 
sophistication of information management. While information management at the headquarters seemed to be targeted in large 
part towards international advocacy and policy, information management in the field focused on very concrete response actions.    
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1. Introduction 
Only a few days after Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines on November 8 2013 the IASC Principals 
declared the disaster a Level 3 Emergency. According to UN OCHA situation report number 34 (as of January 28 
2014) over 14 million people were directly affected and 6201 people lost their lives, whereby the devastation is 
spread across six Philippine islands and 44 provinces. In the response to this disaster, the government of the 
Philippines accepted the offer for assistance of the international community resulting in well over 100 responding 
NGOs and IOs assisting in the on-site emergency operations [1], in addition 22 nations offered military assistance. 
The sheer number and diversity of all these organizations engaged in a collective effort requires considerable 
coordination [2]. One essential condition for successful coordination is the availability of relevant data. This 
includes for example timely and accurate data on the (prioritized) needs of the affected community and data 
regarding the responding community, such as the location, ability, and capacity to respond. Due to the scale of the 
disaster following Typhoon Haiyan, a large amount of data related to these topics was collected. The question 
remains however whether the increase in data collection, as well as with respect to  the needs (for example 
assessments) as to the response (for example the 3W (“Who-does-What”, Where) has led to improved coordination.  
In order to properly address this question an improved and more comprehensive overview of the current 
availability and use of this data is needed, as well as the motivation of decision makers to collect this data. For this 
purpose, researchers and practitioners from Tilburg University and Cordaid (The Netherlands), the University of 
Agder (Norway), and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (USA) joined forces in the Disaster Resilience Lab to conduct 
a field research trip in the wake of the response to the Typhoon. In this paper we outline the approach and present 
preliminary findings, whereby we focus on the interplay between coordination and information management. 
 
2. Research Approach 
The starting point of our field research approach was the ACAPS report on decision makers’ needs in sudden 
onset disasters [3]. Based on the report’s suggested taxonomy, we subsequently conducted interviews in the field 
with decision makers at different hierarchical levels and with different functions, mostly with a formal responsibility 
in information management such as Information Management Officers (IMOs). The interviewed decision makers 
represent mainly UN organizations, and organizations that were active within one of the clusters. In total, 35 in-field 
interviews were conducted in a ten day period; initially in Manila where most of the Headquarters were based, and 
subsequently into the field operations starting in Cebu, via Tacloban and ultimately in Guiuan. The interviews were 
semi-structured, in which we followed a process to identify (1) the information needs of the decision makers, (2) the 
decisions they need to make and (3) the tools and processes they use. In addition to the interviews, observations are 
used to verify and complement the results from the interviews and additional material was obtained during and 
sometimes after the interview. 
 
3. Preliminary findings  
During the field research we were able to reflect on the various coordination mechanisms at different inter 
organizational levels (e.g. between NGO and IO), intra organizational levels (between headquarters and field level) 
and geographical level (national versus provincial versus local level).  
At the national level in Manila OCHA, together with the government ministries of the Philippines designed a 
humanitarian coordination structure based on the UN cluster system. Within these national clusters coordination can 
be challenging as meetings have an ‘open’ character and a variety of participants are able to voice their views. 
Furthermore the cluster staff and meeting participants change regularly and usually many organizations are present 
at these meetings. For example, no less than 56 different organizations were participating in the shelter cluster. In 
addition to the numeric complexity, the thematic focus of the clusters seemed to create additional challenges in 
achieving an integrated approach. For example, issues related to schools were discussed both in the shelter (as 
temporarily housing) and the education cluster.  
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At the provincial level, the national humanitarian architecture could not always be directly applied. The province 
of Cebu implemented the UN cluster approach for their disaster risk reduction program already in 2008, and 
implemented several further adaptations. For example the chamber of commerce and local companies play a large 
role in one of the clusters. The response taskforce Paglig-on that was operationalized after the typhoon followed this 
“provincial” cluster structure and deviated therefore from the national cluster system. OCHA in Cebu seemed to 
have adapted to this by taking on a more advisory role, clarifying leadership roles in clusters and by co-locating in 
government buildings. In Tacloban, on the other hand, OCHA rolled out the UN cluster system as is and was located 
separate from the local government.  
In addition, NGOs had their own coordination mechanisms in parallel. For example NASSA of the Philippines 
had received support from a selection of their Caritas International member organizations such as Cordaid or Caritas 
Germany. Therefore, these Caritas member organizations held their own coordination meetings amongst themselves. 
Additionally they leveraged the very well organized Catholic church system in the Philippines to reach out in an 
easy way to the local communities, for example by using dioceses and parishes to conduct surveys among the 
affected population. They also worked via the cluster system by seconding a representative from each supporting 
Caritas organization to a cluster, but this obviously implied an additional coordination effort. 
Lastly, for NGOs, IOs and local governments the intra-organizational coordination was found to be particularly 
difficult between the people in the field and headquarters, due to geographical distance, bandwidth constraints and 
different information needs. This also led to considerable information requests from headquarters to which the field 
had to comply. 
4. Conclusions 
Through our observations and interviews in the capital city of Manila and in field offices, we were able to identify 
several gaps between the international humanitarian coordination system and local coordination mechanisms. These 
gaps also played out in the information management and information flows, where for example certain NGOs 
preferred to put their scarce time in managing their own more granular data rather than to provide data to the 
headquarters in Manila. Conversely, data from local actors in the field that did not meet the imposed data standards 
could not be included in the reporting mechanisms of the international humanitarian system.  
 
Our findings further show a decreasing complexity and rigidity of coordination structures from the headquarters to 
the (deep) field. Coordination was perceived as heavy, political and outward-oriented in the headquarters, and light-
weigt, no non-sense and inward focused in the (deep) field. Similarly, information management at the headquarters 
seemed to be targeted in large part towards international advocacy and policy shaping of the international 
humanitarian community, while  information management in the field focused on very concrete response actions. 
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